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
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
Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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Soviet Reaction to Recent Actions of
the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement

The Soviet media are firmly supporting the recent actions of the Armed Forces Movement, including the creation of popular councils and the de facto seizure of the Socialist Party's newspaper.

The Soviets have faithfully reiterated Portuguese Communist statements endorsing the Armed Forces Movement's actions as providing a new basis for unity between the "popular masses" and the MFA, facilitating the revolutionary process and countering the "subversive" schemes of "counterrevolutionary" forces supported by "foreign imperialists." The Portuguese Socialists have now been openly labeled as "counterrevolutionary," and their actions branded as "sabotage" aimed at undermining the revolution.

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Belgrade Says No to Balkan Regionalism

Belgrade has again stated its objections to Balkan cooperation schemes that would involve Bulgaria.

A recent article in an authoritative foreign affairs journal argues that the regional initiatives of the Karamanlis government will make no significant progress until all issues dividing individual Balkan countries are resolved. Any attempt to move toward multilateralism prematurely would risk harming the interests of another Balkan country and therefore could actually discredit the cause of regionalism.

Bulgaria is still the problem. The article contends that Bulgaria's uncompromising approach to the Macedonian minority problem burdens not only relations with Belgrade, but also the political atmosphere of the entire region. The article strongly implies that the Bulgarian regime serves the great power interests of the USSR and Bulgaria cannot be regarded as an independent country pursuing its own regional self-interests.

The assertive tone may well be Belgrade's reaction to the strong public support for closer regional cooperation that accompanied Premier Karamanlis' recent visit to Bulgaria. The Yugoslav regime presumably feels the time for holding its tongue in deference to the new Greek government is past.

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Soviet Party Officials Involved
in Brandt Visit

During the recent visit of former FRG chancellor Willy Brandt to the Soviet Union, officials of the Central Committee's International Department took over trip arrangements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel who had been working with the West German embassy. Among the party officials was the head of the department's sector for Germanic affairs, a person of much higher rank than the party functionaries normally in contact with the embassy. One Soviet involved in the visit, apparently nonplussed by the apparatchiki's intervention, commented, "We have two governments in the Soviet Union."

Brandt presented a protocol problem because he has no present governmental post and heads a bourgeois political party. In the end, the visit was handled on a party-to-party basis.

Although the International Department is generally concerned with relations between the CPSU and non-ruling communist parties, its involvement in the Brandt visit does not necessarily represent any expansion of its responsibilities. The protocol distinction between visiting state and party dignitaries has blurred in recent months. Party secretary Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, met with representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in June, following the fall of Saigon. Foreign Minister Gromyko, on the other hand, has met with several foreign communist party leaders over the past two years including PCI chief Berlinguer during his recent visit to Italy.

This inter-mixing of party and government roles does not necessarily indicate any special tension between the Central Committee and the ministry, although some working-level officials may be put out

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by the handling of particular visits. The overlapping responsibilities extend to the highest levels of authority. The various Central Committee departments, including the one Ponomarev heads, serve the Politburo, on which Gromyko sits. Thus Gromyko outranks Ponomarev, although the International Department may seem to have more clout than the ministry.

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